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NOTES
CONFLICT OF LAws-DoMICILE OF AN INCOMPETENT-In
attempting to determine the domicile of a lunatic or incompetent
the degree of insanity should be the first inquiry.. The question
is not as to insanity qua insanity, but as to whether at a particular
time a person had sufficient mentality to intend to establish a
domicile at the place lie was then living in or to change his domicile
from that place to another., The Supreme Court of New HampIWharton, Conflict of Laws, 3rd Ed.. p. i15: "The test, however, of the
power of an adult to change his own domicile, is his capacity to do the acts and
form the intention requisite to such a change with understanding and reason,
and not his general condition as sane or insane."
Culver's App., 48 Conn. j65 (88o), in which the court said that while the
deceased did not have sufficient mentality to manage his affairs, still he was able
to decide where he preferred to live.
Holyoke v. Haskins, 5 Pick. 26 (Mass., t827). "There are thnse, and not a
few, who may be unable to manage their property and other concet ns with good
judgment and discretion, and need guardians to protect them from imposition,
.and who nevertheless have sufficient understanding to choose their homes."
(588)

NOTES

shire has said in a leading case:' "In no case at the present day is
it a mere question whether the party is insane. The point to be
established is, whether the party is so insane as to be incapable of
doing the particular act with understanding and reason. This
would be the essential question now, where marriage is alleged to
be void by reason of insanity, and the same test would be applied
in determining the question of capacity to change the domicile:
Had the party at the time sufficient reason and understanding to
choose her place of residence?"
In the case of idiots, that is, persons who from birth are without intellect and incapable of forming any intention,& the same
rules apply-as in the case of infants:' they never acquire sufficient
intelligence to choose a home for themselves, and are dependent
on those in whose custody they are placed. The same is true of
an infant who becomes insane during his minority, and never
thereafter attains sufficient intelligence to select a residence for
himself; likewise as to one who becomes insane after his majority,
but who, up to the time of seizure, has never acquired a domicile
of choice.'

When the insanity does not appear until after a domicile of

choice has been acquired, the situation may become more compli-

cated, and there is a resulting diversity in the authorities. Whether
a committee has been appointed or not, the primary question is
still as to the degree of insanity. The appointment of a committee is, of course, evidence as to the mental state of the alleged
incompetent: it should not, however, be deemed conclusive, for
a man may not be able to manage his property or protect himself

from imposition, and yet be perfectly competent to decide as to
his domicile.4 When such a degree of sanity has never existed
since the incompetent became insane, the question as to his domicile hinges upon the appointment of a committee.'
The English rule seems to be that the committee or guardian
cannot change the domicile of the incompetent, and that it remains
2Concord v. Rumney, 45N. H. 423 (1864).
3 Bouvier, Rawle, Rev., Vol. 1, p. 976.
4Upton v. Northbridge, i5Mass. 237 (1818); Alexandria v. Bethlehem, t
Harr. 119 (N. J. L., 1837); Payne v. Dunham, 29 I1. 125 (1863); Rex v. Inhab.
of Much Cowarne, 2 B. & A. 861 (Eng., 1831)-Parke, J.: "If the pauper were
a minor he would have continued unemancipated. Now it is found he was incapable of maintaining and taking care of himself though imbecility of mind;
he must therefore be considered in the same situation as if he had remained a
minor."

'Sharpe v. Crispin, i P. & M. 61i (Eng., 1869); Washington v. Beaver, 3
1842).
' It as been recognized in a number of cases that a lunatic or incompetent,
under the guardianship of a committee, may himself change his domicile, a clear
intent so to do being shown. Mowry v. Latham, 17 R. . 480 (1893); Talbot v.
Chamberlain, 149 Mass. 57 (1890).
W. & S. 548 (Pa.,

7 If no committee were appointed, it would seem that the incompetent's

domicile remains where it was when he became insane. He has not the capacity
to acquire a new one, and it is well settled that prima facie, a domicile once acquired is retained.
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as of the time when he began to be legally treated as insane.s It
is submitted that the same doctrine prevails in this country.$ It
is sometimes stated that a distinction is made between national
and municipal domicile, and that the latter is subject to control.
by the committee.,* The cases which support the latter view
involve a change of residence, not domicile;" that the two are not
synonymous is too well settled to require discussion.
In a recent case in New York it was held that a committeecould change the domicile of its ward.12 The incompetent's domicile of origin was in Canada; he came to New York, entered business, became naturalized, and clearly acquired a domicile of choice
at that place. After about thirty years' residence he decided to
repatriate himself, and to the end of returning to his birthplace in
Canada for the rest of his life, closed out his business. He did
not leave at once, however, and while still in New York with theclearly expressed intention of leaving shortly, he became insane
and a committee was appointed. The committee's domicile was
the same as the incompetent's domicile of origin; they removed
him thither, where, after several years he died without having
become sufficiently sane to choose for himself. On a question as
to whether the New York probate of his will should be original orancillary, the Surrogate held that he died domiciled in Canada.
It is settled law that a domicile of origin is retained until a
new one is acquired: the domicile of origin may be abandoned,
but since no one can be without a domicile and there is none other
to assign, there is a prima facie presumption that that of origin is
retained." When a domicile of choice is abandoned and none
other is acquired, there are two possibilities: first, that in theinterim the domicile of origin reverts, or second, that the domicileof choice holds until a new one is acquired. 1" The first view seems
I DiceY, Conflict of Laws, and Ed., p. 149; Westlake, Private International
Law, 5th Ed.. §251; Bempde v. Johnstone, 3 Ves. Jun. 198 (1796).
'Story, Conflict of Laws, 8th Ed., p. 49 (note); Minor, Conflict of Laws,
§ 55; Talbot v. Chamberlain, 149 Mass. 57 (1889); Pittsfield v. Detroit, 52 Me.
442 (:866); Freeport v. Stephenson Co., 41 Ill. 495 (1868).
10 Minor, 1 55.
21Wharton, 3rd Ed., p. 114: "Whether a domicile acquired when sane can
be divested by a guardian of the ward after the latter has become insane, may bedoubted. It has been denied in Maine, but affirmed in Vermont and Massachusetts." The cases cited as supporting this view in the two latter states involved a determination of residence, not domicile. Anderson v. Anderson, 42
Vt. 350 (1870); Holyoke v. Haskins, 5 Pick. 2o (Mass., 1827); Cutts v. Haskins, 9"
Mass.
(:8t3).
142 In these cases the jurisdiction of a probate court depended
on the incompetent's residence.
The same rule has been applied in the case of a minor whose father and mother
were dead, where the question was in what town the minor should be taxed.
Kirkland v. Whately, 4 All. 462 (Mass., 1862), and where the question was oneof juri-liction, Ex parte Bartlett, 4 Bradf. 221 (N. Y., 1855).
12Matter of Robitaille, 78 N. Y. Misc. 1o8 (1912).

'1Bell v. Kennedy, L. R. I H. L. 307 (t868); Arkaman v. Ar k n, 3 Macq.
854 (Eng., 1861); Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617 (1893); Shaw v. Shaw, 98 Mass,.
158 (1870).
14Dicey, 2nd Ed., p. zig.
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to be favored by the English authorities,"5 while in the main the
American cases have adopted the second possibility. "' But even
supposing that the English view was accepted, it could scarcely
be argued that the incompetent in the principal case had abandoned
his domicile in New York before becoming insane. There must
be an abandonment aninzo el facto: intention alone, no matter
how clearly expressed, is insufficient.'? If the act of the incompe'tent was fulfilled by his removal by his committee, yet at that
time, being insane, he had not the intention: if his intention was
considered as continuing, yet the act of going was not his own act.
In other words, the act and the intent were never co-existent.
That he in fact returned to his domicile of origin would only be
important if he had indeed abandoned his domicile of choice; in
such case the presumption of reversion of the original domicile
would be stronger.
Since, then, the incompetent did not abandon his domicile of
choice, and never became sufficiently sane to acquire of his own
volition a new one, he died domiciled in New York unless his committee had power by its own action to change his domicile. As
previously stated, the view that it had such power would seem to
be opposed to the weight of authority in England and this country, but under the peculiar facts of the case it is undoubtedly true
that plausible arguments may be made in favor of the decision of
the court.
The criticism has been made that the doctrine which allows
a committee to fix a lunatic's domicile regards the relation as
similar to that of father and child: but that a father can never
give his son a domicile separate from his own, and that therefore
the committee is given greater power over its ward than a father
over his child."S It will be noted that this objection does not apply
to the principal case, for there the incompetent's alleged domicile,
as it happened, simply followed that of his committee. Perhaps
the strongest argument for the decision is that constructive domicile is a question of presumed intention. Many cases have held
1sUduy v. Uduy, L. R. i Sco. App. 44i (1869), per Lord Chelmsford: "This
is the necessary conclusion, if it be true that an acquired domicile ceases entirely

when it is intentionally abandoned, and that a man can never be withoutadomtcite. The domicile of origin always remains, as it were, in reserve, to be resorted
to in case no other domicile is found to exist."
'aMitchell V. U. S., 2 1 Wall. 350 (U. S., 1874); Vischer v. Visher, 12 Barb. 640

(N. Y., 1851); Shaw v. Shaw, 98

ass. 158 (1867); Price v. Price, t56 Ia. 617

(1893); Hartford v. Champion, 58 Conn. 268 (1890).
7 Goods of Raffenel, 32 L. J. P. & At. 203 (Eng., 1869), Is an extreme case
illustrative of this principle. The deceased decided to leave France after her
husband's death and return to her home in England. She boarded an English
steamer at Calais, but became ill and re-landed in France before the vessel left
harbor. Although wishing to leave France, she was unable to do on account of
ill health, and died there several months later. It"was held that she retained her
French domicile, there not having been a sufficient act of abandonment.
1SDicey, 2nd Ed., p. i49.
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that a natural guardian may change a minor ward's domicile,""
but that an appointed guardian cannot;2 this distinction would
be explained under the above proposition by saying that ties of
blood and affection render it more probable that the minor would
wish to be with a natural guardian than with an appointed guardian.21 In the principal case, there was no doubt as to the incompetent's intention ultimately to return to Canada; that was his domicile of origin, and the domicile of his committee. Therefore, it
might be argued that the incompetent's committee bore the same
relation to him as a natural guardian to his ward. There appear
to be two objections to this argument. In the first place it is
doubtful whether a minor's domicile follows that of his father or
other natural guardian because in such case it may be presumed
that the minor would wish to be with such person. A minor is
under an absolute disability to choose for himself during minority,
and it would seem to be inconsistent to attribute to him a presumed intention which will be effectual in changing his domicile.
It would appear to be more reasonable that the law has simply
made an exception for reasons of policy or otherwise in the case
of natural guardians, and has refused to extend the exception so
as to include appointed guardians. In the second place, it is
possible to draw a distinction between the situation of a minor and
a lunatic in respect to this question. A minor cannot choose
for himself simply because of his minority, while a lunatic is disqualified because his disease renders it impossible for him legally
to have an intention or an appreciation of the quality of his acts;:
assuming that an intention may be presumed and given effect in
the case of a minor, it does not seem to follow necessarily that a
lunatic may be presumed under rather similar circumstances tohave such intention.
In order to acquire a domicile the law requires a free and conscious choice of residence coupled with an intention of remaining
indefinitely in the place so chosen; to allow one person or group
of persons to change the domicile of another is to disregard these
fundamental requirements. Moreover, there seems to be noreason why the law should make an exception to the general rule
in this instance on the score of possible hardship to the incompetent; for the settlement of his affairs the last domicile he has
himself chosen always remains, and the committee may still change
its ward's residence as it sees fit and to his best interests. The
fear of the New York court in the principal case-" that an insane
woman duly domiciled here could not then be returned to her own
" Lamar v.Micou, 114 U. S. 218 (1884); Darden v. Wyatt, z5 La. 414 (855);
Dresser v.Co., 4Z Fed. 257 (1892); Van Matre iv.Sankey, 148 II. 356 (1893);:
Dedham v. Natic , z6 Mass. 135 (1819).
- Woodward v. Woodward, 87 Tenn. 64 0888); Mears v. Sinclair. IV.
Va. 18,5 (0865); Daniel vt. Hill, 52 Ala. 430 (1875);.Hilestand vt.Kunsi, 8 Blackf..

345 (Ind., 1846).

22Minor, I 4i.

NOTES

family residing in a foreign land"-need never be realized, if there
be born in mind the often stated distinction between residence
and domicile.
S.A.
Co.rNIoN CARRiERS-ELEVATORS-BASIS OF LIABILITY FOR
ACCIDNT-RES IPSA LOQ UITUR-Harrisv. Guggenheim,' in theAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, is a late
case treating of the liability of one operating an elevator to those
who may be injured by it. The plaintiff was a servant of one of
the tenants in the defendant's building. He had pushed a loaded
truck onto the car of the freight elevator and, at the invitation of
the operator was himself about to step aboard. The car suddenlydropped a foot or more, injuring the plaintiff. The court, in granting a new trial said that if the jury should find this to be the ordinary use of the freight elevator, consented to by the owner, theunexplained drop was such an unusual occurrence as to call upon
the defendant to explain it and rebut fault.
The legal position of the owner or lessee of improved real
estate who maintains an elevator en which passengers are carried,
has an interest that grows with the increase in the number of high
buildings. A brief comment upon the cases is not amiss. Roughly,
they adhere to three theories of liability: I. He is a common
carrier of passengers, and is liable as such.2 2. He is not a common carrier, but is liable for the same high degree of fareasifhe
were.5 3. He is only liable for a failure to exercise reasonablecare, under the circumstances.4
Perhaps it was not altogether unnatural, when these questions
began to arise, for the courts to look for guidance to other instances
of transportation rather than to other instances of landlord's or
tenant's liability. Whatever may be said as to this analogy, it
is clear that the first and second views prevail and an elevator
operator is held, in most jurisdictions to the same standard of care
as a common carrier. The law exacts from him "the utmost careand diligence of a very cautious person, as far as human care and
foresight can go," and mulcts him in damages "for injury occa--'
138 N. Y. Suppl. 1037 (1913).
s Deposit Co. v. Sollitt, 172 Ill. 222 (1898); Cooper v. Century Realty Co.,
T23 S. W. Rep. 848 (Mo., 1909); Springer v. Ford, 189 Ill. 430 (19o); Orcutt v.
Bldg. Co., 2o Mo. 424 (19o6); Mitchell v. Marker, 62 Fed. 139 (1894). but notea contrary dictum in Bigby v. U. S., io3 Fed. 597 (i9oo); Fox v. Philada., 208Pa. 134 (1904).
readwell v. Whittier, 8o Cal. 574 (1889); Fox v. Phila. 208 Pa.

127 (I9o4);.

Hotel Co. v. Camp, 97 Ky. 424 (1895); Association v. Lawson, 97 Ten. 367

(816); Sweeden v. Imp. Co., 125 S. W. Rep. 439 (Ark.,

19io);

Edwards v. Burke.

36 Wash, 107 (1904).

Burgess v. Stowe, 134 Mich. 204 (19o3); Edwards v. Mfrs. Bldg. Go., 27
188 (I~oi). In Gibson v. Trust
R. I. 248 (i9o5); Griffin v. Manice, 166 N.
Co., it is said that the question has never been raised in Massachusetts, but it It
83 (t886), involving an elevatorv.
Rand,
142
Mass.
to be noted that Shattuch
accident, was decided upon the ordinary principleb of negligence.
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sioned by the slightest neglect, against which human prudence
and foresight might have guarded."
The mere happening of an
accident raises a presumption of negligence.'
Like many minority views, the position taken under the
third theory appears the more logical, and is ably defended by its
adherents.
The common carrier has, from ancient times, been subjected
to extraordinary responsibilities-a survival of the liability once
attaching to all common callings, and due to the public nature of
the service. From whence, then, comes the necessity for applying this harsh rule to operators of elevators?
It is difficult to see how such a one can be termed in fact a
-common carrier. He is not compellable to carry, and he does not
serve the publi. His duty is solely to hip tenants; to carry them
and their invitees. As it was put in one case he may "shut the
door in the plaintiff's face and arbitrarily refuse to carry him,
without incurring any liability.", If he be not a common carrier
in fact, what is then the basis of a liability equal to that of a common carrier? -The courts have emphasized the fact of carriage and
the great danger of vertical transportation.' But the relation of
private carrier also possesses the same points of contact, and there
is no argument for-a similar liability for the private carrier. Besides this, it is to be noted that there are many things in the conduct of a building which are probably more dangerous to those
who enter it, than an elevator, and for which the landlord is bound
to use only reasonable care. An open hatchway, a steam boiler,
an electric wire, are instances.
When it is remembered that the degree of care under the third
view is proportioned to the danger,$ it becomes apparent it is just
to all parties. No doubt there are many cases where it would be
difficult to prove the negligence that probably existed. But there
is no need to take the presumption of negligence from the law of
carriers, to aid the plaintiff. The jurisdictions adopting the third
view apply at the same time the doctrine res ipsa loquilur, and as
is seen in the principal case, the proof of an accident and surrounding circumstances, in such cases, raises a primafacie case for the
plaintiff, upon which he is entitled to go to the jury..
With all respect for the law as it is, it is submitted that the
minority view basing the liability upon that of a landlord for the
condition of his premises, and applying the doctrine res ipsa loquitur in appropriate cases, is the correct one from any standpoint.
J.C.D.
'See Fox v. Phila., supra.
sSeaver v. Bradley, 179 Mass, 329 (19o1).
ITreadwell v. Whittier, supra.
'Savage v. Bauland, 42 App. Div. (1899).

See also Stackpole v. Wray, 99 App. DIv. 262 (1904) and Griffin v. Manice
Jupra.

NOTES
NEGLIGENCE-WHO ARE FELLOW SERVANTS-In applying

the

fellow servant rule, relieving the employer of all liability for ac-

cidents caused by the negligence of a fellow servant of the plaintiff,
it is sometimes hard to determine who are fellow servants. A
recent case in Michigan' decided that the plaintiff, who was employed by a purchaser of motors to inspect them before acceptance,
was not a fellow servant of the employee of the defendant motor
company, who was testing the motors in order to enable the plaintiff to make the inspection, as he is not employed by the same
master or subject to the same control.
The general rule as to who are fellow servants is that they are
all those who are under the control and direction of a common
master in whose business they are engaged at the time of the ac-

cident.2 While this rule is fairly well sectled its application is
sometimes very difficult. This is especially true in the case of
.independent contractors. Ordinarily an independent contractor
is one who is ordered to accomplish a certain thing, but uses his
own method of accomplishment and the servants of such a person
are not fellow servants of the servants of him who employs such
contractor.$
The rule does not apply as between a servant and a viceprincipal. A servant who has the authority to employ other
servants under his immediate supervision takes the place of the
master and is not a fellow servant to the persons over whom he
has control.' Where, however, the injured servant has been
lent to the employer of the negligent servant and is acting under
his direction and control he is a fellow servant of the latter though
still in the general employment of a third party.* In such cases
there are decisions which say that he must know of and assent to
the lending.$
The fellow servant rule does not apply to risks of danger, not
especially brought about by the fact that they are fellow servants,
but such as anybody not in the same employment might run.
After his working day is over and he has left employer's premises

he is no longer a fellow servant of any of his co-employees.7
is he during dinner hour if spent off the premises.$

Nor

The rule applies not only to persons having a contract with
tJohnson v. E. C. Clark Motor Co., z39 N. W. Rep. 30 (Mich., 1912).
'Wyllic
v. Palmer, 137 N. Y. 248 (1893).
3
Johnson v. Lindsay & Co., L. R. 1891 App. Cases, 17t (Eng., 1891); U. P.
R. Co. v. Billeter, 28 Neb. 422 (189o); L. N. 0. & T. R. Co. v. Conroy, 63 Miss.
562 (1886); Wagner v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 188 Mass. 437 (9o5).
'Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Williams.
Tex. 4 (1889); Denver S. P.& P. R. Co.
v. Driscoll, 12 Colo. 520 (1889); Leighton Steel Co. v. Snell, 217 Ill. 152 (1905).
'Rourke v. White Moss Colliery Co., 2 C. B. D. 205 (Eng., 1876); Hasty
1

v. Sears, 157 Mass. 123 (1892).

'Johnson v. Lindsay, L. IL 189 A. C. 371 (Eng., 1891); Morgan v. Smith,
159 Mass. 570 (089).

7 Baird v. Pettt, 70 Pa. 477 (1872).
I Boyle v. Columbia Fire Proofing Co., 182 Mass. 93
v. St. P. & Duluth R. Co., 46 Minn. 39 (i89i).

(1902);

Schumaker
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the employer, but also to volunteers. Where a person has no
interest in the work and volunteers his services he stands in the
same position as a regular employee and voluntarily assumes the
risks attendant upon fellow service.* But where the person volunteering has some interest and has the permission of the defendant
to do the work he is not a fellow servant.,s
Some courts have said that the reason for the rule is that the

servants being together daily are in a position to influence their
fellow servants into using proper care in the exercise of their
duties. Following from the reason for it the rule should not apply
to those persons who do not come unto close contact with each

other.,& Thus persons working in different departments of the

same work who do not come into personal contact with each other-

are not fellow servants.1'

Another test which has been laid down is that all engaged in.

an employment in the exercise of ordinary sagacity would have.
been able to foresee when accepting it that the negligence of a
fellow would probably expose them to injury."'

At the present time approximately fourteen states have passed
employers' liabilify acts which either partially or entirely do awaywith the fellow servant rule.
E.L.H.
PARTNERSHIP-WHAT

CONSTITUTES

THE

RELATION-In

Floyd v. Kicklightcr1 plaintiff and defendant had entered into
what they termed a "partnership agreement" for the purpose of
buying and selling a tract of land. Plaintiff agreed to advance
$t5,ooo, the price of a tract upon which the defendant had an
option, and the defendant with the money so advanced was 'to
buy the land, sell to a purchaser then in prospect for a greater
price, and after payment of expense incident to the purchase and
sale, the balance of the proceeds was to be equally divided between
them; the parties agreed to be jointly liable for expenditures.
The court held that these allegations sufficiently stated a case of
partnership to withstand a general demurrer.
Efforts have been made rather frequently to formulate a
definition of partnership that would be at once both brief and
comprehensive.' Pothier's definition is this: "Societas est con-

SEason v. R. R. Co. 6S Tex. 577 (1886); N. 0. J. &G. N. R. R. v. Harrison,

48 liss. 112 (i873); Longa v. Stanly Hod Elcv. Co., 69 rX.J.L. 31 (1903).
1 Street Ry. Co. v. Bolton, 43 Ohio, 224 (1885); cf. Wischan v.Rickards,
36 Pa. 109 (189).
"1Beulter v. Grand Trunk June. Ry. Co., 224 U. S. 85 (I911).
2C. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Moranda, 93 ill. 302 (1879); Sullivan v. Mo. Pac.
R., 97 Mo. 119 (1888). Under a statute, Meyers v. San Pedro L. A. & S. L. R.
Co., 1o4 Pac. Rep. 736 (Utah, i o9).
"Collins v Vhiteside, 75 NJ. L 865 (i908).
176S.E. Rep. ioiz (Ga., 1912).
21e definitions collected in Lindley on Partnership. Eighth Edition, pp..
10, I1.

.NOTES

Iractus de conferendis bona fide rebus aut operis animo lucri quod
honestum sit ac licitum in commune faciendi."3 In this country
the definition contained in Story on Partnership' has been quoted
probably more often than any other: "Partnership, often called
co-partnership, is usually defined to be a voluntary contract between two or more competent persons to place their money, effects, labor and skill or some of them in lawful commerce or business with the understanding that there shall be a communion of
the profits thereof between them." Most text-writers, however,
refer to partnership not as a contract, but as a relation arising out
of contract. The difference of opinion among courts as to what
constitutes a partncrship, the rather illogical distinction sometimes
made between partnerships as to third persons and partnerships
between the parties, the abrogation of old rules in more recent
decisions, will all appear upon an examination of a few of the more
important authorities. The old test that one who shares in the
profits is a partner as to third persons, was first announced in
Grace v. Smith,' where it was said: "Every man who has a share
of the profits of a trade ought also to bear his share of the loss.
If anyone takes part of the profits, he takes a part of the
fund which the creditor relies upon for payment." In Waugh v.
Carver' the court applied the test laid down in Grace v. Smith,
and agreed that while by their agreement "with respect to each
other these persons were not to be considered as partners, yet they
have-made themselves such with regard to their transactions with
the rest of the world." Under these cases it should be noted, that
it was a sharing of net profits that constituted a partnership;
sharing gross returns was held not to establish the relation either
between the parties or in respect to third persons.?
A distinction was then made between receiving part of the
profits as profits, and receiving a sum in proportion to profits; the
former was held practically to be conclusive evidence of the existence of a partnership, the latter to be entirely consistent with the
relation of debtor and creditor and not to be evidence that the
parties were partners. This distinction may be found in numerous
English and American authorities.'
3 Pand. Lib. XVII, Tit. 2, Sec. z, Art. I.
S4qeventh Edition, Sec. 2.
W. 1. , 98 (1775).
62 It. B. 235 246 (1793). And see in accord: Heskett v. Blanchard, 4
East 145 (1803); Gellar v. IHutchinson, x Rose 297 (1812); Cheap v.Cramond,
'2

4 B. & Aid. 663 (1821).
7 Wilkinson v. Frazier, 4 Esp. 182 (1803); Dry v. Roswell, I Camp. 329
(18o8).
s)So Ex Parte Hamper, 17 Ves. Jr. 410 (181x): "It is clearly settled, though
I regret it, that if a man stipulates that he shall have, not a specific interest in the
business, but a given sum of money even in proportion to a given quantum of the
profits, that will not make him a partner; but if he agrees for a part of the profits
as such, giving him a right to an account, he is as to third persons a partner, and
no siuation can protect him from loss. " Accord: Ex Parte Langdale, 18 Ves.
Jr. 300ul(8 11); Ex parte Watson, 19 Ves. Jr. 456 (1815); Miller v. Bartlett. xiS.
& R.137 (Pa., 1826): Brnckway v. Burnap, 16 Barb. 309 (N. Y., 1853); see also
authorities discussed in Pierson v. Stcinmyer, 4 Rich. L. 309 (S. C., 1851), and

Eastman v. Clark, 53 N. H. 276 (1873).
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In Cox v. Hickman' a new test of partnership was laid down.
The House of Lords, by Lord Cranworth, declared that "the
liability of one partner for the acts of his co-partner is in truth
the liability of a principal for the acts of his agent. . . A right
to participate in profits affords cogent, often conclusive, evidence,
that the trade in which the profits have been made was carried on
in part for or on behalf of the person setting up such a claim, but
the real ground of liability is that the trade has been carried on
by persons acting on his behalf." Since Cox v. Hickman, English
courts have not regarded a sharing of profits as conclusive evidence
of the existence of a partnership, and though the "agency test"
seems to have had some qualification in England under the "intent" theory, it has been adopted and approved in many American
states-'*

The court in Mollwo v. Court of Wards" declared that Cox v.
Hickman dissolved the rule of law then existing and laid down
principles of decision by which the determination of cases of this
kind is made to depend, "not on arbitrary presumptions of law,
but on the real intention and contract of the parties." The importance of the intent of the parties has been emphasized in many
of the cases. "Intent," however, must not be misconstrued; when
the facts are clear the intent is matter of law. So if the parties
have assumed the rights and obligations of partners, the relation
of partnership will be held to exist, even though they expressly
stipulate in the agreement that they are not to be partners,'s and
though the word "partnership".is ued in the agreement, if from all
circumstances. the contract is inconsistent with that relation, it
will be held not to exist.13
Beginning with Cox v. Hickman, in England, there has been
a tendency to repudiate the old idea that there can be a partnership as to third persons, when the relation does not exist between
the parties themselves, the case of holding out of course apart.
This tendency is well expressed in the case of Beecher v. Bush:14
'8 H. of L. Cas. 268 (i86o). And see adopting this "agency test:" Kilshaw
v. Jukes. 3 Best & Sm. 847 (x863); Bullen v. Sharp, L. R. i C. P. 86 (x865); Re
English & Irish Church Society, i Hem. & M. 85 (1863); Holme v. Hammond,
L. R. 7 EX. 233 (1872).

10Eastman v. Clark, 53 N. H. 276 (1873); Central City Savings Bank v.
Walker, 66 N. Y. 424 (1876); but c/. Leggett v. Hyde, 58 N. Y. 272, 28t 1874);
Harvey v. Childs, 28 Oh. St. 319 K;876); Hart t879);
v. Kelley,
83 Pa.
t. 286 45 Mich.
877);
v. Bush,
Beecher
Re Ward, 8 Reporter 136 (U. S. D. C(. Tenn.,
188 (i88i); Culley v. Edwards, 44 Ark. 423 (1884); Buzard v. First National
Bank, 2 S. W. Rep. 54 (Tex., 1886); Meehan v. Valentine, 29 Fed. Rep. 276 (Pa.,
1886), Wild v. Davenport, 48 N. J. L. 129 (1886).
1 L. R. 4 P. C. 419 (1872).
1 Pooley v. Driver, SChan. Div. 458 (t876); Ex pare Delhasse, 7 Chan.
Div. 5 1 (1877); Moore v. Davis, ii Chan. Div. 261 (1877); Manhattan Brass &
Manufacturing Co. v. Sears, 45 N. Y. 797 (1871); Cooley v. Broad, 29 La. Ann.
345 (1877); Cothran v. Marmaduke, 6o Tex. 371 (1883); Stevens v. Gainesville
ational Bank, 62 Tex. 499 1884).
1 Livingston v. Lynch, 4 ohns. Ch. 573. 592 (N. Y., 1820); Oliver v. Gray
. Ark. 42S (1841); Sailors v. Nixon Co., 20 Ill App. 5o9 (1886).
1445 Mich. 188 (188t).
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"There can be no such thing as a partnership as to third persons,
when there is none as between the parties themselves, and third
persons have not been misled by concealment of facts or by deceptive appearances."
It is generally conceded that there may be, as in the principal
case, a partnership between persons who contemplate but a single
venture, such as the shipment and sale of but one lot of goods, or
the joint purchase and sale of but one chattel or one piece of land,
but there must be clear evidence of an intent to create the rights
and obligations ordinarily incident to partnership'
There are
also numerous cases holding that there may be a partnership,
though one party furnish all the capital." It is important to
consider, however, in such case, whether the capital is risked in
the business, or is to be repaid at all events, in determining whether
the money is furnished as partnership capital or merely as a loan."
In our principal case the court intimates that there is a difference in Georgia between what constitutes a partnership as to
third persons, and as between the parties themselves; we are not
told clearly what would be sufficient to indicate a partnership as
to third persons, but "as among partners, the extent of the partnership is determined by the contract and their several interests. "Is
It is pointed out that there was here a joint enterprise, a joint
risk, a joint sharing of expenses, and a joint interest in profits and
losses,-allegations at least sufficient to withstand a general demurrer. It would seem clear either under the "agency test," or
having a regard to the legal intent of the parties, that the agreement was one of partnership, and that the plaintiff was entitled to
an accounting.
H.A.L.
TORT-NEGLIGENCE OR NUISANCE-An owner of land who
causes work to be done thereon by an independent contractor is
not liable to third parties for injuries received due to the negligent
manner in which such work was donet yet if the nature of the
work was such as to result in a dangerous or unsafe condition
"6 DeBerkom v. Smith, i Esp. 29 (Eng., 1793); Purdy v. Hood, 5 Martin
N. S. (La., 1827); Solomon v. Solomon, 2 Ga. 18 (1847); In re Warren, 29 Fed.
Cas. No. 17191: Scule v. Hayward, i Cal. 395 (I8o); 26o Hogsheads of Molasses, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14296 (1866); Hill v. Sheibley, 68 Ga. 556 (1882); CoMmonwealth v. Arnheim, 3 Pa. Sup. 304 (1896).
16Pawsey v. Armstrong, 18 Ch. Div. 698, 706 (881); Emanuel v. Crane,
14 Ala. 303 (1848); Brownlee v. Allen, 21 Mo. 123 (1855); Kuhn v. Newman, 49
Ia. 424 (1878); Pierce v. Shippee, 90 Ill.
371 (1878); Couch v. Woodruff, 63 Ala.
471 (1879); Tyler v. Scott, 45 Vt. 261 (1873).
'? 22 Amer. & Eng. Cyc. of Law; 2d Edition; p. 34, and cases there cited.
"8Civil Code of Ga., Sec. 3156.

I Bloomer v. Wilbur, 176 Mass. 482 (1900): "The negligence, if any, was

in a mere detail of the work. The contract did not contemplate such negligence and the negligent party is the only one to be held."

Welfare v. Brighton

R. R. Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 693 (1869); Uggla v. Brohaw, 117 App. Div. 586 (N. Y.
1907).
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amounting to a nuisance, the owner of the land cannot escape
liability for any consequential harm since he is under a duty to
maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition. s
This distinction between liability for a tort of negligence and a
tort of nuisance was very forcibly illustrated in a recent New
York case' where the defendant was sued for injuries to a passerby
on the highway caused by the falling of an advertising sign which
had been erected by an independent contractor. The plaintiff
was given a verdict on the theory that, as the work had been
negligently constructed, the defendant was guilty of maintaining
a public nuisance. In a previous decision' on. practically the
identical statement of facts, the same court found in favor of the
opposite party since the plaintiff had endeavored to establish his
ground of recovery upon the defendant's failure to have the work
properly completed.
In order to bind an owner of land for the negligence of one
whom he employs to do work thereon, it must be clearly shown
that the relation of master and servant existed.' The test of this
relationship is.the right of control.$ It is a question whether the
employee represents his employer as to the result of the work only
or as to the means as well as the result., If the employee is subject to the control .of the employer as to the means, he is not an
independent contractor,' and the negligence of the employee may
be imputed to his employer.' This same rule applies, even where
the one undertaking to do the work is an independent contractor,
when the object of the employment is inherently or intrinsically
dangerousto or wrongful in itself" since the duty of care in such
'IMarsh v. Brewing CO., 92 Minn. 182 (19o4); Garland v. Toune, 55 N. H.
55 (1874); "The distinction appears to be that when work is being done under a

contract, if an accident happens, and an injury is caused by negligence in a matter
entirely collateral to the contract, the liability turns on the question whether

the relation of master and servant exists. But when the thing contracted to be
done causes the mischief and the injury can only be said to arise from the authority of the employer, because the thing contracted to be done is imperfectly
performed, there the employer must be taken to have authorized the act and is
responsible for it." Hole v. R. R. Co., 6 H. & N. 488 (1861); Dickinson v. the
Mayor, 92 N. Y. 584 (1883).
'McNulty v. Ludwig & Co., 13 N. Y. Suppl. 84 (1912).
1 MeNulty v. Ludwig & Co., 125 App. 291 (N. Y., 19o8).
IHole v. R. R., supm.

, Vosbeck v. Kellogg, 78 Minn. 176 (t899); Connor v. P. R. R., 24 Pa. Sup.

241110
4 McNe

v. Steel CO.. 207 Pa- 493 (i9o4); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rohn, 132

u. S. 5,8 (1889).

'Street Ry. Co. v. Brown, 49 Mich. 153 (1882): Downey v. Min. Co., 24
Utah 431 (1902); Young v. Smith & Kelly Co., 124 Ga. 475 (i9o5); Ry. Co. v.
lludgins,
loo Pa. 4 09 (1902).
0
F Sullivan v. Dunham, 35 App. Div. 342 (N. Y.. 1898); Gaslight Co. v.
Norwalk, 63 Conn. 495 (1893); R. R.Co. v. Morey, 47 Ohio 207 (1890); Wetherbee v Partridge. 175 Mass. 185 (1900).
" Rex v. Medley, G. C. & P. 292 (1834); Waller v. Lasher, 37 Ill. App

6o9 (i89o).
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instances cannot be shifted from the instigator of the operations."2
In ordinary circumstances, however, where the work has been
delegated to an independent contractor, the employer is not
responsible for the latter's negligence," provided, of course, he has
exercised all reasonable care and judgment in the selection of the
contractor.
On the other hand where one creates a nuisance no degree of
care"t will excuse him, for his duty to the public is absolute."5 The
absence or presence of negligence in no way alters the creator's
position,ts and his liability for the negligence of the independent
contractor under such circumstances is founded upon his own act
in causing the nuisance to come into existence."7 In the principal
case the fact that the sign encroached upon the highway, in violation of a local ordinance, and fell to the ground, thereby injuring
the plaintiff, was sufficient evidence that it was not only not
properly and securely fastened, but also constituted a public
nuisance.," It is a situation in which the doctrine of res ipsa

loquilur may be justly applied."$
Just where the line may and can be drawn between these two
grounds of liability is invariably a close and difficult question,
inasmuch as every nuisance presupposes some degree of negligence.
It would seem that the fundamental difference lies in the nature
of the work to be performed and the duty thereto attached. Where
the work contracted to be done amounts to a nuisance the duty
arises at once and there is a continuing liability which cannot be
transferred to one who may have been the means whereby the
nuisance was created. But if the acts to be done may be safely
performed in the exercise of due care, although in the absence of

such care injurious consequences to third persons would be likely

to result, then the one executing such acts is liable, provided the

instigator of the acts exercised due care and precaution in his
"2R.Ainsworth
R. v. Mitchell,
6oo397
(19o8);
(i865):
v. Lakin,107I8OMd.
Mass.
(19o2).Homan v. Stanley, 66 Pa. 464
'Forsythc v. IHooper, ii Allen 419 (Mass. 1873); Khron v. Brock, 144
Mass.
(2887);
Co. v. Cray, 19 Md. App. 565 (1897); Ziebell v. Lumber
Co., 33516
Wash.
591 Iron
(2903); Keip v. Baptist Church, 9 Me. 308 (1904).
"Pitcher v. Lennon, x6 Misc. 609 (N. Y., 2896); Kearney v. Ry. Co., L R.
6Monrey.
Q. 13. 47
759Ohio
(187);
v. Robinson,
4 Exch.15 S.
163(849);
R. R. Co. v.
2o7 Chauntter
(! 8go); McCarrier
v. Hollister,
D. 366 (1902).
Tarry v. Ashton, i Q. B. D. 324 (1876); Canfland v. 1ardingham, 3
Camp. 398 (1813); People v. Cunningham, i Denio 524 (N. Y., 1845); Turnpike
Co. v. Rogers, 2 Pa. 124 (1845); Gunter v. Geary, i Cal. 462 (1851).
1" Lamming v. Galusha, 135 N. Y. 239 (1892); Tearney v. Powder Co., t3t
I1. 322 (189o); Sullivan v. Waterman, 2o R. 1.372 (1898).
"Holliday v. Telephone Co., L. R. I Q. B. 221 (898); Fisher v. Ruck, t2
Pa. Sup. 240 (900); Norcross v. Thomas, 51 Me. 503 (1863); Woodman v.
Metropolitan R. R., 149 Mass. 335 (1889).
18Com. v. Kembel, 30 Pa. Sup. i99 (x966); Valparlso v. Bozarth, 153 Md.
.536 (1899); Hearst Pub. Co. v. Spiss, 117 Ill. App. 436 (2o4); Dunsback v.
Hollister, 49 Hun. 352 (N. Y., 1888); Hockney v. State, 8 Md. 494 (1857).
19Cummings v. Furnace Co., 6o Wis. 6o3 (1884); Murray v, McShane, 52
Md. 217 (1879); Turnpike Co. v. Yates, 1o8 Tenn. 428 (1902).
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selection.s In other words, if the work itself created the danger
or injury, then the ultimate superior or proprietor is liable to persons injured by a failure properly to guard or protect the work
even though the work is intrusted to an independent contractor;
and such superior or proprietor cannot shield himself by a plea
and proof that the work was so intrusted."
As a final word it might be stated that the whole question
comes to the point of when the duty of care arises and ends. It
cannot be doubted that the case under discussion falls within the
exception as to the liability for maintenance of a nuisance and
the fact that the plaintiff was denied recovery in .this original
suit was due more to faulty pleadings than a denial of his substantive rights.
W. A. W., zd.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF N.
J
AND PA. ACTS-VALIDITY OF STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF WAIVER

OF CoNu.toN LAW RIGHTS-A decision of considerable importance
was rendered in. April by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. In
the case of Sexton v. N evrk Dist. Tel. Co., that tribunal, by a
unanimous opinion, declared in the clearest terms that the Employer's Liability Act in that state was constitutional. This
opinion is of especial interest to the bench and bar of Pennsylvania,
since the provisions contained in the Workmen's Compensation
Act now before the legislature for consideration are, in their constitutional aspects, practically identical with the New Jersey Act*
which the decision sustains. It seems worth while, accordingly, to
point out jast how closely these articles of the Pennsylvania Act
resemble the sections involved in the New Jersey one, and to
indicate exactly how the constitutionality of the latter were upheld.
In gard to the first section of the Act abolishing certain
common law defenses, and which is precisely similar in substance
and practically so in form, as far as any question of constitutionality is concerned, with the Pennsylvania statute, the New Jersey
court said: "Cases are numerous and we think uniform in holding that the defenses modified or abolished by Section Is may be
modified or abolished by the legislative power when they relate,
as here, to an injury sustained by an employee after the legislative
provision becomes effective."a And further on in the opinion it
20 Tarry v. Ashton, supra; Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black 408 (U.S., 1802);
Engle v.Eureka Club, 137 N. Y. 100 (1893); Bibbs Adm. v. R. R., 87 Va. 711
(189!); Young v. Lumber Co., 147 N. C. 26 (1898); Callahan v. R. R., 23 Iowa.
562 (1867).
0 Water Co. v. Ware, 83 U. S. (16 Wall.) 566 (1872).
-

Not yet reported.
'Act of April 4, 1911.

Act I of proposed Penna. Act.

'The New Jersey court, after citing many cases in support of thier con-

clusion, quoted at length from the opinion in the Second Employer's Liability
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was declared: "Certainly . . .Section I of the Act is clearly a valid
and constitutional amendment."
After disposing of this question the court then considered the
constitutionality of Section II of the New Jersey Act, s which, like
Article II, Section I, of the Pennsylvanias one, provides for a
scheduled scheme of compensation. It should be noted that in
each Act the compensation is to be paid irrespective of the negligence of the employer; and in the principal case it was argued for
the defendant that as this provision compelled payment without
fault, it could only be binding on the employer with his consent,
since otherwise such compulsory payment would deprive him of
property "without due process of law." In reply to this contention the court pointed out that the Act itself did not impose: liability without fault in a compulsory manner, because this section
of the statute was not binding upon the employer unless he chose
to accept it; and, if he did not desire to accept this scheduled automatic liability he was perfectly free to declare so and could remain
liable under the modified form of common law set forth in Section
I., The opinion reads: "Under the Act neither the employer nor
the employee is bound to accept the provisions of Section H1 unless
he chooses to do so. If he does not accept, he certainly is not deprived of property without due process of law. If he does accept,
then he has given the consent which . . . he must give to bind him."
And again, "It is left entirely optional with them (employer and
employee) whether they will stand upon the first or second sections of the Act," and, hence, there is no compulsory taking of
property without the consent of the party. In view of the fact
that the provisions in the Pennsylvania Act which deal with these
points are, as has been said, practically identical in their requirements, the same conclusion would seem almost inevitably to be
required.
Another point made by the defendant was that, in the case
under discussion, the Act impaired the obligation of pre-existing
Cases, 223 U. S. r, especially from Page fx, declaring that "A person has no

property, no vested interest in any rule of the common law .
.
. but the
law itself as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will . . . . of the Legislature unless prevented by Constitutional limitations."
I This clause, if accepted, provides for a scheduled scheme of compensation
to be made "without regard to the negligence of the employer . . . .when
the injury or death. .. . . ..
is the result of an accident arising out of and in
the course of the employment except when . . . . intentionally self-inflicted
or when intoxication is the proximate cause."
$This is almost identical with Act II, sec. i, of the present Pennsylvania
Act, which, when accepted by the parties, provides that the schedule in Sections
5 and 6 of the same article shall determine the compensation to be paid, and the
payment thereof shall be made "for personal injury to or for the death of such
employee by an accident in the course of his employment. . . .by the employer without regard to negligence. . . .except when the injury or death
be intentionally self-inflicted."
I This provides, in effect, that if either employer or employee desire to remain under the modified common law liability they can do so by giving notice.
Art. II, sec. 3 (b) of the Penna. Act. is precisely similar.
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This contention was based upon the fact that the

plaintiff was employed by the defendant prior to the time when
the Act became effective, but subsequent to the passage of the
statute; and it was argued that there was no duty to define their
positions until the Act went into effect. Without going into the
argument further it is sufficient to say that the court rejected this
contention on the ground that the parties could have easily changed
their position at any time between the date of the passage of the
Act and the time it became effective if they had chosen to do so.
The possibility of a similar contention has, it should be noted.
been foreseen and provided against in the Pennsylvania Act,'
which is expressly declared to go into effect at once, but not to
apply to accidents arising before July I, 1913. Hence, this particular question cannot arise in the construction of the statute in
Pennsylvania.
Perhaps the chief point of importance in the case, however,
is the sustaining of the constitutionality of the legislatively imposed
presumption that, with respect to contracts of hiring made subsequent to the Act the parties are conclusively presumed to be
acting under the second section' unless one party or the other does
not, before the accident, expressly elect to operate under the
first."s This presumption in the New Jersey case under discussion
is practically identical in form, substance and meaning with the
corresponding clause in the Pennsylvania Act;,, and, as the court
pointed out, was made to favor the adoption of Section II as being
the fairest for both parties and as binding until rejected instead of
the converse, because such a course seemed least likely to cause
trouble to all concerned. It was conceded that some presumptive
rule was necessary in order to prevent confusion and useless litigatioa; and, concerning the validity of the one established, the
court said: "Really, the matter comes (lown to a question of presumption or burden of proof which it is entirely within the control
of the legislature to regulate so long as the parties are left entirely
free to make whatever contract they choose, as they are in this
case.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that .

.

. the section is

constitutional."
'Article III, we. 8; as amended when first submitted to the State Lgislature.
I Which imposes the automatic liability schedule regardless of the absence

of fault of the employer.
iS Which abrogates most of the common law defences of the employer.
u N. J. Act, Sec. i, Act 9. "Every contract of hiring made subsequent
this act takes effect shall be presumed to have been made
to the time .....
with reference to the provisions of Section II of this act. . .unless there be . .
an express statement in writing, prior to any accident .

.

.

. or on written

notice by either party that these provisions are not to apply."
Penn. Act, Art. II, sec. 3 (a), "In every contract of hiring. . . express or
implied, it shall be conclusively presumed that the parties have accepted the pro.
. . . unless there be. . .an express statevisions of Art. II of this Act.
ment in writing from either party to the other that the provisions of Art. II are
not intended to apply."

NOTES

This statement in the New Jersey case-namely: that as a
general rule of law it is well within the constitutional power of the
legislature to impose a presumptive rule of evidence, provided that
a fair and reasonable opportunity to rebut the same is also afforded-is undoubtedly correct." It is submitted, however, that
the real point involved is of a more intricate nature and turns
upon the question of the power of a state legislature to enact a
presumption that common law rights are waived and a statutory
remedy in itself unconstitutional accepted unless such common
law and constitutional rights and privileges be expressly and
affirmatively claimed by the parties. It should also be noted
that this presumption is more than a mere doctrine of evidence
under the principles just cited, and is, in reality, an absolute rule
of law. It is believed, however, that the contention that this
statutory created presumption is unconstitutional can be disposed
of and the validity of such a provision upheld. In the first place,
it is settled that in civil proceedings the protection of a constitutional provision may be waived.1" It has also been decided that
where a claimant voluntarily avails himself of a statutory remedy
instead of resorting to that given him at common law he is regarded
as having taken this statutory remedy with all its incidents and
cannot complain of any resulting infringement of his constitutional
rights.'" Now the terms of the New Jersey and Pennsylvania Acts
afford the parties a perfectly fair chance to choose between remaining under the modified form of common law liability and accepting
the automatic schedule of compensation. In fact the only way
in which the case quoted is distinguishable consists in the fact
that under these Acts there is a presumptive acceptance of the
statutory form which must be removed by affirmative steps while
under the decision ante there is no original handicap upon the
plaintiff's course of action. It is believed, however, that the mere
imposition of this presumption should not be regarded as unduly
burdensome and, therefore, invalid under the doctrine of Ex
parte Young." Finally, on the direct question raised, it has been
expressly decided in Foster v. Morse" that statutes of this kind,
establishing presumptive rules of law that parties are regarded as
having waived their constitutional rights unless they affirmatively
assert them, are constitutional" and valid exercises of the legislative power.
12Fong

v. U. S.,

w49

U. S. &)8 (1892); R. R.

Co. v. Turnipseed,

219

U. S.

535 (191o); Adams v. N. Y., 192 U. S. 585 (193).
'3 Budge & Turnpike Co., v. Norfolk, 6 Al!en 353 (Mass., t863), affirmed
in 201 Mass. 23 (19o9); Vose v. Cochroft, 44 N. Y. 415 (1871); affirmed in t64
N. Y. App. 258 (1900).
1 Ralston v. Brusler, 120 Ohio, to5 (1861).
": 209 U. S. 123 (1907).
1 S.32 Mass. 354 (1882).

7The decision of the State courts upon questions of this character isconclusive; and the Federal courts will not take jurisdiction, on the ground that
such waivers of constitutional provisions do not in themselves present any
Federal question. Leunard v. U. S. & Pac. R. R. Co., 198 U. S. 416 (1904);
M. J. & Kan. City R. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 210 U. S. 187, 204 (I907).
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Therefore, since the opinion of the New Jersey court in regard to most of the constitutional questions involved seems almost
conclusive and since the provisions of the Pennsylvania Act are,
as has been shown, in these aspects practically identical with those
of the New Jersey Statute, and finally, since the determination of
the Massachusetts court in Foster v. Morse" seems decisive of the
only really doubtful provision, it would appear entirely clear that
the Pennsylvania Act, if passed in its present form, must and should
of necessity be sustained as constitutional and valid by the judicial
tribunals of this state.
P. C. M., Jr.
IsNote x6, supra.

